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Abstract—The development of large-scale distributed control
systems has led to the outsourcing of costly computations to
cloud-computing platforms, as well as to concerns about privacy
of the collected sensitive data. This paper develops a cloud-
based protocol for a quadratic optimization problem involving
multiple parties, each holding information it seeks to maintain
private. The protocol is based on the projected gradient ascent
on the Lagrange dual problem and exploits partially homomor-
phic encryption and secure multi-party computation techniques.
Using formal cryptographic definitions of indistinguishability,
the protocol is shown to achieve computational privacy, i.e.,
there is no computationally efficient algorithm that any involved
party can employ to obtain private information beyond what
can be inferred from the party’s inputs and outputs only. In
order to reduce the communication complexity of the proposed
protocol, we introduced a variant that achieves this objective at
the expense of weaker privacy guarantees. We discuss in detail the
computational and communication complexity properties of both
algorithms theoretically and also through implementations. We
conclude the paper with a discussion on computational privacy
and other notions of privacy such as the non-unique retrieval of
the private information from the protocol outputs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent push towards increasing connectivity of devices
is enabling control applications to span wider geographical
areas such as cities or even countries as in the case of
smart grids. This increase in the number of available sensors,
actuators and data has led to an increase in the controllers’
required computational capacity for such applications. One
solution that has gained important traction is to outsource the
computations to powerful remote servers, generically called
clouds. Cloud-based computation services offer the potential
to aggregate and to process information that is gathered from
a large number of distributed agents, in domains such as
machine learning, signal processing, smart grids, autonomous
vehicles and control over the Internet-of-Things. Notwith-
standing, there are substantial challenges that arise from the
privacy-sensitive nature of some of the collected data. Secure
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communication to and from the cloud is a crucial aspect, but
is not sufficient to protect the users’ data. Recent examples
such as data leakage and abuse by aggregating servers [1]–
[3] have drawn attention to the risks of storing data in the
clear and urged measures against an untrustworthy cloud. A
plethora of different schemes addressing this challenge have
been proposed in the literature, spanning many research areas.
Schemes that allow secure function evaluation on private
inputs from multiple parties while preserving the privacy of
the data involved have been a desirable technique for many
decades, coining the term secure multiparty computation.
Some secure multiparty computation protocols provide com-
putational security, while other provide information theoretic
security. Computational security guarantees that there is no
computationally efficient algorithm the parties involved in the
protocol can implement so that they gain private information
beyond what can be inferred from their inputs and outputs
of the protocol only. On the other hand, information theoretic
security guarantees that no algorithms of unlimited computa-
tional power exist that can lead to private data leakage. One
approach within this context is to encrypt the computation
itself. This primarily refers to Yao’s garbled circuits, intro-
duced in [4], and the protocol of Goldreich-Micali-Widgerson,
introduced in [5], where both allow secure evaluation of
functions represented as Boolean circuits. Although powerful
with respect to the functions they can evaluate, garbled circuits
require constructing high depth circuits and transmitting them
over a communication channel, which incurs a substantial cost
in computation and communication. While many improve-
ments in the efficiency of garbled circuits have been made
over the years, the complexity still prohibits the usage of such
schemes in real time applications [6].
Another path within secure multiparty computation with
computational security guarantees is computing on encrypted
data. This approach, suggested in [7] under the name “privacy
homomorphisms”, is currently known as homomorphic en-
cryption. Homomorphic encryption allows evaluating specific
types of functionals on encrypted inputs. Homomorphic en-
cryption comes in three flavors: fully, somewhat and partially
homomorphic encryption. Fully homomorphic encryption al-
lows evaluation of Boolean functions over encrypted data
and was introduced in [8], and further improved in terms of
efficiency in [9]–[11]. However, the computational overhead
is prohibitive, due to the complexity of the cryptosystem
primitives and size of the encrypted messages [12]. Somewhat
homomorphic encryption schemes, e.g. [13], are less complex,
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2but support only a limited number of operations (additions and
multiplications). Partially homomorphic encryption schemes
are tractable but can support either multiplications between
encrypted data, such as El Gamal [14], unpadded RSA [7]
or additions between encrypted data, such as Paillier [15],
Goldwasser-Micali [16], DGK [17].
While the above techniques ensure that the output is cor-
rectly computed without revealing anything about the inputs
in the process, depending on the application, an adversary
might be able to learn information about the input only from
the output. Techniques such as differential privacy ensure that
the revealed output does not break the privacy of the input.
Differential privacy, introduced in [18] and surveyed in [19],
[20], adds controlled randomness in the data, so that the results
of statistical queries do not tamper with the privacy of the
individual entries in a database, by introducing uncertainty in
the output. However, the noise determines a trade-off between
the accuracy of the results of the differentially private queries
and the privacy parameter.
A. Related work
Homomorphic encryption has been recently used to design
encrypted controllers, with partially homomorphic encryption
schemes for linear controllers in [21], [22], model predictive
control applications in [23], [24], with fully homomorphic
encryption in [25], and to design observers in [26]. Uncon-
strained optimization problems are commonly used in machine
learning applications, e.g., for linear regression, and several
works have addressed gradient methods with partially homo-
morphic encryption [27], [28] or with ADMM in a distributed
setting [29]. However, adding constraints substantially com-
plicates the optimization problem by restricting the feasible
domain. In addition, constraints introduce nonlinear operations
in the optimization algorithm, which cannot be handled in-
herently by the partially homomorphic cryptosystems. In our
prior work [30], [31], we showed how to overcome these
difficulties by using blinded communication in a centralized
setup. Recently, [32] proposed a distributed approach to the
constrained optimization problem with homomorphic encryp-
tion, where each party locally performs the projection on the
feasible domain on unencrypted data.
Examples of works that tackle private linear programming
problems or machine learning applications with optimization
subroutines using garbled circuits, secret sharing, and hybrid
approaches between the above are [33]–[37] and the references
within. In control applications, works such as [38]–[41] em-
ploy differential privacy to protect dynamic data. Furthermore,
examples such as [42]–[44] make use of differential privacy
techniques in optimization algorithms. Other lines of work
solve optimization problems with non-cryptographic methods:
using transformations, e.g. [45]–[48], which guarantee an
uncertainty set around the private data, or using arbitrary
functions for obfuscating the objective functions in a special
graph topology [49].
B. Contributions
In this paper we consider a privacy-preserving cloud-based
constrained quadratic optimization. In control theoretic ap-
plications and machine learning, linear and quadratic opti-
mization problems arise frequently – e.g., state estimation
under minimum square error, model predictive control, support
vector machines – which require privacy guarantees of the data
involved in the computation.
We develop a new tractable optimization protocol to pri-
vately solve constrained quadratic problems. Our protocol
relies on cryptographic tools called encryption schemes. To
solve the optimization problem on encrypted data, we use an
additively homomorphic encryption scheme, where, in short,
addition commutes with the encryption function. Thus, a party
can process encrypted data without having direct access to the
data. The novelty is how to handle in a privacy-preserving
manner the constraints of the problem that introduce non-
linearities that cannot be supported by additively homomorphic
encryption schemes. We show that a projected gradient method
that operates on the Lagrange dual problem can alleviate this
problem and can be efficiently run on encrypted data by
exploiting communication between the participating parties.
The main contributions of our work are the following:
• We formally state and prove computational security guaran-
tees for such protocol. The proof relies on applying crypto-
graphic tools to the specific optimization algorithm that runs
over multiple iterations.
• We propose an alternative protocol which sacrifices some
privacy but involves less communication overhead.
• We implement the protocols and show the computational and
communication complexity produce reasonable running times.
Furthermore, we emphasize the difference between the
computational security guarantee with the non-unique retrieval
guarantee that is important in such optimization problems. We
finally point out that the present manuscript provides detailed
security proofs and analyses not available in previous versions
of the papers [30], [31].
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows: we formulate the problem in Section II and formally
introduce the computational security guarantees in Section III.
We describe the cryptographic tools we use in Section IV,
more specifically, the partially homomorphic scheme, along
with its properties and the symmetric encryption used. In
Section V, we describe the optimization theory behind the
proposed protocol and justify the choice of the gradient
method. Furthermore, we present the main protocol and the
subroutines that compose it and in Section VI, we show
that the protocol achieves privacy of the agent’s data and of
the target node’s result. We discuss possible relaxations of
the security guarantees and propose a more efficient protocol
under these weaker conditions in Section VII. In Section VIII,
we provide a privacy analysis of the problem concerning the
input-output relation. We present the complexity analysis of
the protocols and show that the experimental results point
out reasonable running times in Section IX. Additional tools
necessary for proving the security of the proposed protocol are
introduced in Appendix A and further details on the protocols
used are given in Appendix B. Finally, the detailed privacy
proofs are given in Appendix C.
Notation. We denote matrices by capital letters. Rm×n
represents the set of m × n matrices with real elements
3and Sn++ represents the set of symmetric positive definite
n×n matrices. Element-wise inequalities between vectors are
denoted by . The notation x← X means that x is uniformly
drawn from a distribution X . Pr denotes the probability taken
over a specified distribution. We refer to algorithms that are
run interactively by multiple parties as protocols.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A. Motivating Examples
Quadratic optimization is a class of problems frequently
employed in control system design and operation. As a first
motivating example, consider the problem of estimating the
state of a dynamical system from privacy-sensitive sensor
measurements. For instance, such a problem arises in smart
houses where the temperature or energy readings of the sensors
are aggregated by a cloud controller and can reveal whether
the owners are in the building. In particular, let the system
dynamics and sensor measurements be described by:
xt+1 = Axt + wt
yt = C xt + vt,
(1)
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, where wt, vt are process and measure-
ment noise respectively. The system and sensor parameters
A ∈ Rn×n, C ∈ Rp×n can be thought as publicly available
information while the sensor measurements y0, . . . , yT−1 are
privacy-sensitive data. The untrusted cloud has to collect the
measurements and output an initial state estimate x0 of the
system to a target agent, while maintaining the privacy of the
sensor data and final output. A simple state estimate may be
found as the solution to the least squares problem:
min
x0∈Rn
1
2
∑ᵀ
t=0
‖yt − CAt x0‖22 =
1
2
‖y −O x0‖22, (2)
where
y =

y0
y1
...
yT−1
 , O =

C
CA
...
CAT−1
 (3)
and O ∈ RTp×n is the well-known system observability
matrix. More general state estimation problems may also
include constraints, e.g., the initial state may lie in a polyhedral
set Dx0  b where the shape of the polyhedron captured
by the matrix D is publicly known but its position and size
captured by the vector b is private information.
As a second example, consider a control problem with
privacy-sensitive objectives. Suppose we are interested in
steering a dynamical system:
xt+1 = Axt +B ut
yt = C xt,
(4)
starting from a private initial position x0 while guaranteeing
safety state constraints of the form:
xt  xt  xt, t = 1, . . . , T, (5)
where xt, xt for t = 1, . . . , T are private values. Such prob-
lems arise when exploring vehicles are deployed in uncertain
or hazardous environments or when different users compete
against each other and want to hide their tactics.
Denote by xr and ur the private values such that the system
is guaranteed to track a reference r. Then, we need to solve
the problem:
min
xk∈Rn,uk∈Rm
1
2
T−1∑
t=0
‖yt − C xrt‖2Q + ‖ut − urt‖2R
s.t. xt+1 = Axt +B ut, yt = C xt
xt  xt  xt, t = 1, . . . , T,
(6)
where Q,R are positive definite cost matrices and we used
the quadratic norm notation ‖z‖2P := zᵀPz.
The publicly known system dynamics (4) are equality
constraints which can be eliminated to obtain a control input
design problem with only linear inequality constraints:
min
xk∈Rn,uk∈Rm
1
2
T−1∑
t=0
uᵀt Ht ut + [ x0 x
r
t u
r
t ]Ft ut
s.t. xt  At x0 +
t−1∑
j=0
At−1−jB uj  xt,
t = 1, . . . , T,
(7)
with Ht and Ft are matrices that depend on the costs Q,R and
the system’s dynamics (4) appropriately computed from (6).
B. Problem statement
The above examples can be modeled as constrained
quadratic optimization problems with distributed private data.
We consider three types of parties involved in the problem:
a number of agents Ai, i = 1, . . . , p, a cloud server C and
a target node T . The purpose of this setup is to solve an
optimization problem with the data provided by the agents and
the computation performed on the cloud and send the result
to the target node. The architecture is presented in Figure 1.
Let us consider a strictly-convex quadratic optimization
problem, which we assume to be feasible:
x∗ = arg min
x∈Rn
1
2
xᵀQC x+ c
ᵀ
Ax
s.t. AC x  bA,
(8)
where the variables and the parties to which they belong to
are described as follows:
Agents A = (A1, . . . ,Ap): The agents are parties with low
computational capabilities that possess the private information
bA and cA. The private information is decomposed across the
agents as: bA = (b1, . . . , bp) and cA = (c1, . . . , cp), with
bi ∈ Rmi and ci ∈ Rni being the private data of agent i such
that
∑p
i=1mi = m and
∑p
i=1 ni = n.
Cloud C: The cloud is a party with high computational
capabilities that has access to the matrices QC ∈ Sn++ and
AC ∈ Rm×n. When the computation is sophisticated and/or
involves proprietary algorithms, QC and AC are private data of
the cloud. In order to capture a greater number of problems,
we will also consider the case where QC or AC are public.
Target Node T : The target node is a party with more
computational capabilities than the agents that is interested
4in the optimal solution x∗ of the problem. The target node
can be either one of the agents or a separate cloud server.
Fig. 1. Architecture of the problem: Agents are low-resource parties that
have private data that they outsource to a powerful server, called the cloud.
The cloud has to solve an optimization problem on the private data of the
agents and send the result to a party called the target node, which will help
with the computations.
Note that in the first motivating example (2), the matrix QC
in (8) corresponds to the publicly known matrix OᵀO and the
vector cA corresponds to the private vector −Oᵀ y. For the
objective to be strongly convex, we require that rank(O) = n,
which also implies standard system observability. Similarly, in
the second example (7), the matrix QC is composed from the
regulating cost matrices, the cost vector cA is formed from
the private initial conditions and steady-state solution for the
reference tracking, mixed by the system’s dynamics, and the
constraints vector bA depends on the private state bounds and
initial condition.
C. Adversarial model
In most cloud applications, the service provider has to
deliver the contracted service or otherwise the clients would
switch to another service provider. This means that the cloud
cannot alter the data it receives. Moreover, the clients’ interest
is to obtain the correct result from the service they pay for,
hence, the agents and target node will also not alter the data.
However, the parties can locally process the data they receive
in any fashion they want. This model is known as semi-honest,
which is defined as follows:
Definition 1. (Semi-honest model) A party is semi-honest if it
does not deviate from the steps of the protocol but may store
the transcript of the messages exchanged and process the data
received in order to learn more information than stipulated by
the protocol.
This model also holds when considering eavesdroppers
on the communication channels. An adversarial model that
only considers eavesdroppers as adversaries differs from the
semi-honest model by the fact that, apart from the untrusted
channels, the parties that perform the computations are also
not trusted. Malicious and active adversaries – that diverge
from the protocols or tamper with the messages – are not
considered in this paper.
The purpose of the paper is to solve Problem (8) using
a secure multiparty computation protocol for semi-honest
parties. This protocol takes as inputs the private data of the
agents, as well as the cloud’s data, and involves the parties
in exchanging messages and participating in some specified
computations, and eventually outputs to the target node the
solution of the optimization problem. This protocol should
guarantee computational security. More specifically, the cloud
cannot obtain any information about the private inputs of the
agents and the output of the target node and similarly, the
target node cannot obtain any information about the private
inputs of the agents and the cloud, other than what they can
compute using their inputs and outputs and public information,
by running a computationally efficient algorithm after the
execution of the protocol.
III. PRIVACY GOALS
We introduce some notions necessary to the security defi-
nitions. In what follows, {0, 1}∗ defines a sequence of bits
of unspecified length. An ensemble X = {Xn}n∈N is a
sequence of random variables ranging over strings of bits
of length polynomial in n, denoted by poly(n), arising from
distributions defined over a finite set Ω.
Definition 2. (Statistical indistinguishability [50, Ch. 3]) The
ensembles X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N are statistically
indistinguishable, denoted
s≡, if for every positive polynomial
p, and all sufficiently large n:
1
2
∑
α∈Ω
|Pr[Xn = α]− Pr[Yn = α]| < 1
p(n)
,
where the quantity on the left is called the statistical distance
between the two ensembles.
It can be proved that two ensembles are statistically indis-
tinguishable if no algorithm can distinguish between them.
Computational indistinguishability is a weaker notion of the
statistical version, as follows:
Definition 3. (Computational Indistinguishability [50, Ch. 3])
The ensembles X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N are com-
putationally indistinguishable, denoted
c≡, if for every prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm D : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1},
called the distinguisher, every positive polynomial p, and all
sufficiently large n, the following holds:∣∣Prx←Xn [D(x) = 1]− Pry←Yn [D(y) = 1]∣∣ < 1p(n) .
The previous definition is relevant when defining the privacy
goals to be guaranteed by the protocol: two-party privacy of
the sensitive data of the parties. The intuition is that a protocol
privately computes a functionality if nothing is learned after
its execution, i.e., if all information obtained by a party after
the execution of the protocol (while also keeping a record of
the intermediate computations) can be obtained only from the
inputs and outputs available to that party.
Definition 4. (Two-party privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behav-
ior [51, Ch. 7]) Let f : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗
be a functionality, and f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) denote the
first and second components of f(x1, x2), for any inputs
x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}∗. Let Π be a two-party protocol for com-
puting f . The view of the i-th party (i = 1, 2) during an
5execution of Π on the inputs (x1, x2), denoted V Πi (x1, x2), is
(xi, coins,m1, . . . ,mt), where coins represents the outcome
of the i’th party’s internal coin tosses, and mj represents the j-
th message it has received. For a deterministic functionality f ,
we say that Π privately computes f if there exist probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms, called simulators, denoted Si,
such that:
{Si(xi, fi(x1, x2))}x1,2∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {V Πi (x1, x2)}x1,2∈{0,1}∗ .
This definition assumes the correctness of the protocol, i.e.,
the probability that the output of the parties is not equal
to the result of the functionality applied to the inputs is
negligible [52].
For protocols that involve more than two parties, Defi-
nition 4 can be extended to multi-party privacy, by also
taking into consideration coalitions of semi-honest parties. We
present this extension in Definition A.1, along with further un-
derlying details related to the cryptographic notion of security
and its interpretation in Appendix A-A.
IV. ENCRYPTION SCHEME
A. Additively Homomorphic Encryption
Let E(·) define a generic encryption primitive, with domain
the space of private data, called plaintexts, and codomain the
space of encrypted data, called ciphertexts. For probabilistic
encryption schemes, the encryption primitive also takes as
input a random number. The decryption primitive D(·) is
defined on the space of ciphertexts and takes values in the
space of plaintexts. Additively homomorphic schemes satisfy
the property that there exists an operator ⊕ defined on the
space of ciphertexts such that:
E(a)⊕ E(b) ⊂ E(a+ b), (9)
for any plaintexts a, b supported by the scheme. Here, we
use set inclusion instead of equality because the encryption
of a message is not unique in probabilistic cryptosystems.
Intuitively, equation (9) means that performing this operation
on the two encrypted messages, we obtain a ciphertext that is
equivalent to the encryption of the sum of the two plaintexts.
Formally, the decryption primitive D(·) is a homomorphism
between the group of ciphertexts with the operator ⊕ and the
group of plaintexts with addition +, which justifies the name
of the scheme. It is immediate to see that if a scheme supports
addition between encrypted messages, it will also support
subtraction, by adding the additive inverse, and multiplication
between an integer plaintext and an encrypted message, ob-
tained by adding the encrypted messages for the corresponding
number of times.
In this paper, we use the popular Paillier encryption, but
any other additively homomorphic encryption scheme can be
employed. The Paillier cryptosystem [15] is an asymmetric
additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Asymmetric or
public key cryptosystems involve a pair of keys: a public
key that is disseminated publicly, and which is used for
the encryption of the private messages, and a private key
which is known only to its owner, used for the decryption
of the encrypted messages. In this section, we will only
present the notation for the encryption and for the allowed
operations between the encrypted messages and postpone the
implementation details to Appendix A-B.
In the Paillier encryption scheme, the private data are ele-
ments of the ring of integers modulo N , denoted by ZN , where
N is a large integer of σ bits, called the Paillier modulus. The
encrypted messages take values in the positive integers modulo
N2, denoted by Z∗N2 . Paillier is a probabilistic encryption
scheme, which means that the encryption primitive also takes
as an argument a random number which, for simplicity, we
avoid in this notation. For a plaintext message a, we denote
the Paillier encryption by [[a]] := E(a), for an instance of the
random number. For readability, we will use throughout the
paper the following abstract notation for the operations on the
encrypted space:
[[a]]⊕ [[b]] d= [[a+ b]]
b⊗ [[a]] d= [[ba]], for plaintexts a, b ∈ ZN ,
(10)
where d= means that the equality holds after applying the
decryption primitive on both sides [15]. The expressions for
the abstracted operations are described in Appendix A-B.
We will slightly abuse these notations to denote encryptions
of vectors and additions and multiplication by vectors and
matrices. In our protocol, the target node T is the owner of a
pair of Paillier keys. Hence, for everything that follows, [[·]]
denotes the encryption with the target node’s public key pkT .
Example: Private unconstrained quadratic optimization. In
order to illustrate the usage of the Paillier encryption scheme
for computations on encrypted data, consider the following
example of an unconstrained optimization problem:
min
x
f(x) =
1
2
xᵀQCx+ c
ᵀ
Ax, (11)
where the variables have the same meaning as in Problem (8)
described in Section II. The cloud has access to the matrix
QC . If the cloud also had access to private data cA from the
agents, the gradient method could be employed to obtain the
optimal unencrypted solution of Problem (11). An iteration of
the gradient method has the form:
xk+1 = xk − η∇f(xk) = xk − ηQCxk − ηcA,
where η > 0 is the step-size chosen by the cloud and
k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 for a number of iterations K. However,
in order to protect their private data and the privacy of the
solution x∗, the agents send the value cA encrypted to the
cloud as [[cA]]. It is very important to notice that for a
quadratic objective function, only linear operations in the
private data xk and cA are required in order to compute one
iteration of the gradient descent algorithm. Hence, by taking
advantage of the additively homomorphic property (10), the
cloud can locally compute the optimal solution by the gradient
descent in the encrypted domain, for all k = 0, . . . ,K − 1:
[[xk+1]] = (I − ηQC)⊗ [[xk]]⊕ (−η)⊗ [[cA]], (12)
and send the final point [[xK ]] to the target node to decrypt and
obtain the desired result. Such a protocol satisfies the desired
security according to Definition 4 provided in Section III by
6the fact that the cloud only has access to data encrypted by a
semantically secure encryption scheme, such as Paillier [15].
More details are provided in Section VI.
However, the optimization problem considered in this paper
is a quadratic problem with constraints, which introduce
nonlinear operations in the optimization algorithm and cannot
be handled inherently by the Paillier cryptosystem. We will de-
scribe in Section V how we leverage communication between
the parties in order to achieve privacy-preserving nonlinear
operations.
B. Symmetric encryption scheme
Apart from the (public key) partially homomorphic cryp-
tosystem above, we will also use a specific symmetric key
cryptosystem for reasons that will become apparent in the
protocol, related to hiding the data from the target node.
This symmetric key cryptosystem is similar to the well-
known one-time pad [53], [54], and can be thought of as
additively blinding a private value by noise. In contrast to
public key cryptography, symmetric key algorithms perform
the encryption and decryption with the same key. For messages
of l bits, the key is generated as sk ∈ Z with length of
λ+ l bits, where λ is the security parameter. The encryption
primitive is E′(a) = a + sk, with a ∈ [0, 2l) ∩ Z, and the
decryption is obtained as a = D′(E′(a)) = E′(a) − sk.
This is also called two-out-of-two additive secret sharing [55]
when the addition is on an abelian group. The security of this
scheme lies on generating a uniformly random key and on
using this key for encryption only once, which yields that the
distribution of E′(a) is statistically indistinguishable from a
random number sampled of l + λ+ 1 bits. For this reason, λ
is called the statistical security parameter. We also notice that
this symmetric cryptosystem is compatible with the Paillier
cryptosystem, in the sense that the two encryptions commute:
D′(E(E′(a)))) = E(a) by using E(sk) instead of sk for
decryption, where E′(a) is performed on the message space
of the Paillier cryptosystem. Such a scheme is commonly
employed for blinding messages, for instance in [56]–[58].
For simplicity, in the protocols described in Section V, we
will directly use the summation with a random number to
depict the above symmetric key cryptosystem, respectively the
difference by the same random number for decryption.
The strength of a cryptosystem relies on the computational
intractability of retrieving the private key from the public
information – an adversary holding the public information
cannot find the private key by brute force computations. Public
key cryptosystems like the Paillier cryptosystem involve a
security parameter σ, which is usually the length of the
modulus of the public key, and symmetric key cryptosystems
involve a security parameter λ, which is the bit-length of the
key. As is common in practice, increasing the size of the
security parameters to values larger than, say 512 bits for σ
and 80 bits for λ, increases the security of the system against
any computationally efficient inference attack.
V. SECURE CONSTRAINED QUADRATIC OPTIMIZATION
In this section we introduce our main algorithmic results.
Let us first describe the optimization algorithm used for
solving the minimization problem (8) on unencrypted data.
For strongly convex problems, one can resort to duality
theory [59, Ch. 5] to compute the projection on the feasible
set, and be able to retrieve the optimal value of the primal
problem from the optimal value of the dual problem. For the
quadratic optimization problem (8), its dual is also a quadratic
optimization problem:
µ∗ = arg max
µ∈Rm
− 1
2
(AᵀCµ+ cA)
ᵀQ−1C (A
ᵀ
Cµ+ cA)− µᵀbA
s.t. µ  0. (13)
The dual objective function is denoted by g(µ) and its gradient
is equal to:
∇g(µ) = −ACQ−1C (AᵀCµ+ cA)− bA. (14)
Under standard constraint qualifications, e.g., Slater’s con-
dition [59, Ch. 5], strong duality between the primal and
dual holds, which means the optimal objective in the primal
problem (8) is equal to the objective in the dual problem (13).
Moreover, the optimality conditions (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker)
hold and are the following:
QCx∗ +A
ᵀ
Cµ
∗ + cA = 0 (15)
ACx∗ − bA  0, µ∗  0 (16)
µ∗i (a
ᵀ
i x
∗ − bi) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m. (17)
For strictly convex problems, i.e., QC ∈ Sn++, the optimal
solution of the primal problem can be obtained from (15) as
x∗ = −Q−1C (AᵀCµ∗ + cA).
An algorithm for computing the optimum in problem (13),
which we will show is also compatible with the partially ho-
momorphic encryption of Section IV, is the projected gradient
ascent method. The projected gradient ascent is composed by
iterations of the following type:
µk+1 = max{0, µk + η∇g(µk)}, (18)
where η > 0 is the step size and µk+1 is the projected value
of µk + η∇g(µk) over the non-negative orthant. For full rank
of ACQ−1C A
ᵀ
C , the dual problem is strictly convex and the
algorithm converges with a linear rate [60] for a fixed step
size η = 1L , where L = λmax(ACQ
−1
C A
ᵀ
C). For non-strictly
convex dual function, the gradient ascent algorithm converges
in sublinear time [60].
A. Projected gradient ascent on encrypted data
As stated in Section II, we aim to solve an optimization
problem outsourced to the cloud on private distributed data
from the agents and send the result to the target node. To
protect the agents’ data, we use an encryption scheme that
allows the cloud to perform linear manipulations on encrypted
data, as described in Section IV. To this end, the target node
generates a pair of keys (pkT , skT ) and distributes the public
key to the agents and the cloud, enabling them to encrypt their
data, which only the target node will be able to decrypt, using
the private key. We consider that all the data is represented on
integers of l bits and comment on this further in Section V-E.
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ascent on encrypted data is performing iteration (18). We
have already seen in the example in Section IV-A that the
update of the iterate in the direction of the gradient ascent can
be computed locally by the cloud directly on the encrypted
data (12). However a first challenge lies in performing the
comparison with zero. Due to the probabilistic nature of the
Paillier encryption scheme, the order on the plaintext space
is not preserved on the ciphertext space and comparison on
encrypted data cannot be performed locally by the cloud.
Notwithstanding, we employ an interactive protocol between
the cloud, which holds the encrypted data, and the target node,
which is the owner of the private key for the Paillier cryp-
tosystem, that achieves the comparison securely. Moreover,
after the comparison is performed, the update of the encrypted
iterate (18) has to be done in a private way, so that the result
of the maximum operation is not revealed to any of the parties
involved (the cloud and the target node). These two steps are
the main computational bottleneck in the protocol we propose,
as both require secure communication between the cloud and
the target node. A preliminary version of this solution was
presented in [31].
We can privately achieve the two steps mentioned above
in three stages. First, the cloud has to randomize the order
of the two encrypted variables it wants to compare (Proto-
col 1). Second, the cloud and target engage in an interactive
comparison protocol that takes as inputs the two randomized
variables and outputs the result of the comparison to the target
node (Protocol 2). Third, the update of the dual iterate is
achieved through an interactive protocol between the cloud
and target node, which takes as inputs the two randomized
variables and the result of the comparison and outputs to the
cloud the updated iterate (Protocol 3). Throughout this paper,
by comparison we mean element-wise comparison, since the
variable µ is a vector.
B. Secure comparison protocol
In order to privately compute (18), i.e., hide the result
from all the parties involved, we want to keep the result
of the comparison of the updated iterate µk + ∇g(µk) with
zero unknown to both the cloud and the target node. The
comparison protocol will reveal the result of the comparison
between the two inputs to the target node T . However, if we
introduce an additional step where C randomizes the order of
the two values that it wants to compare, then T does not learn
any information by knowing the result of the comparison.
PROTOCOL 1: Randomization step
Input: C: [[µ¯]], [[0]], where µ¯ := µ+ η∇g(µ)
Output: C: [[a]], [[b]]
1: C: choose a random permutation pi on two elements
2: C: output [[a]], [[b]]← pi([[0]], [[µ¯]])
Next, we will demonstrate how the comparison protocol
works via the following instantiation. Damga˚rd, Geisler and
Krøigaard introduced a protocol in [17], [61] for secure
comparison of two private inputs of different parties, which
we will call the DGK protocol. To this end, they also propose
an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, which has
the property that checking if the value zero is encrypted is
efficient, which is useful for comparisons and working with
bits. An extension of this protocol to the case where none of
the parties knows the two numbers that have to be compared,
which is of interest to us, and some improvements in terms of
efficiency were proposed in [62].
The comparison protocol that will be used in our opti-
mization protocol is as follows. Let C have two encrypted
values under the Paillier scheme [[a]] and [[b]] that it obtained
after running Protocol 1, and let T have the decryption
key. Furthermore, let T also have the decryption key of the
DGK homomorphic encryption scheme, which we describe
in Appendix B. At the end of the protocol, T will have the
result of the comparison in the form of one bit t such that
(t = 1) ⇔ (a ≤ b). Let l denote the number of bits of the
unencrypted inputs a, b. Protocol 2 is based on the fact that
the most significant bit of (b− a+ 2l) is the bit that indicates
if (a ≤ b). As already explained in Section II, we will use
blinding by random numbers to secure the communication
from the cloud to the target node.
PROTOCOL 2: Protocol for secure two-party comparison with
two encrypted inputs using DGK [17], [62]
Input: C: [[a]], [[b]]; T : skT , skDGK
Output: T : bit t: (t = 1)⇔ (a ≤ b)
1: C: choose random number ρ
2: C: [[z]]← [[b]]⊕ (−1)⊗ [[a]]⊕ [[2l + ρ]], send [[z]] to T
. z ← b− a+ 2l + ρ
3: T : decrypt [[z]]
4: C: α← ρ mod 2l
5: T : β ← z mod 2l
6: C,T : perform a comparison protocol, e.g, DGK, such that C gets
δC and T gets δT with δC Y δT = (α ≤ β) . Y denotes the
exclusive or operation
7: T : encrypt [[z ÷ 2l]] and [[δT ]] and send them to C
8: C: [[t′]]←
{
[[δT ]] if δC = 1
[[1]]⊕ (−1)⊗ [[δT ]] otherwise
9: C: [[t]]← [[z ÷ 2l]]⊕ (−1)⊗ ([[ρ÷ 2l]]⊕ [[t′]])
. t← z ÷ 2l − ρ÷ 2l − t′
10: C: send [[t]] to T
11: T : decrypts [[t]]
The security of this protocol is proved in [17], [61], [62]
and the proof is omitted here.
Proposition 1. Protocol 2 is secure in the semi-honest model,
according to Definition 4.
C. Secure update protocol
Moreover, we need to ensure that when the cloud C updates
the value of the dual iterate at iteration k+1 in equation (18),
it does not know the new value. The solution is to make the
cloud blind the values of [[a]] and [[b]] and send them to the
target node in this order, where the latter selects the value
accordingly to the comparison result and then sends it back
to the cloud. However, there are two important issues that
have to be addressed in order for the update step to not leak
information about the sign of the iterate: the blinding should be
additive and effectuated with different random values, and the
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if the blinding is multiplicative, by decrypting the product, the
target knows which one of the values is zero. Moreover, if the
two values are additively blinded with the same random value,
the target can subtract them and reveal at least if the value
is zero. Re-randomization of the encryptions is necessary so
that the cloud cannot simply compare [[a]] and [[b]] with the
received value. This can be done by adding an encryption of
zero or by decryption followed by encryption. Protocol 3 is
the solution to the update problem:
PROTOCOL 3: Secure update of the dual variable
Input: C: [[a]], [[b]]; T : t such that (t = 1)⇔ (a ≤ b)
Output: C: [[µ]]
1: C: choose two random numbers r, s
2: C: [[a¯]]← [[a]]⊕ [[r]], [[b¯]]← [[b]]⊕ [[s]]
3: C: send [[a¯]] and [[b¯]] to T
4: if t = 0 then T : [[v]]← [˜[a¯]] = [[a¯]] + [[0]]
5: else T : [[v]]← [˜[b¯]] = [[b¯]] + [[0]]
6: end if . Refresh the ciphertext
7: T : send [[v]] and [[t]] to C
8: C: [[µ]]← [[v]]⊕ r ⊗ [[t]]⊕ [[−r]]⊕ (−s)⊗ [[t]]
. µ← v + r(t− 1)− st
The intuition behind the protocol is that if a ≤ b, then t = 1
and we obtain µ = b¯ − s = b, and otherwise, t = 0 and we
obtain µ = a¯−r = a. In both cases the cloud correctly updates
the dual variable with the projected value.
D. Protocol for solving strictly-convex quadratic problems
Having defined these protocols, we can now build a protocol
that represents one iteration (18) of the dual projected gradient
ascent method.
PROTOCOL 4: Secure iteration of the dual projected gradient
ascent method
Input: C: AC ∈ Rm×n, QC ∈ Sn++, [[bA]], [[cA]], η > 0, [[µk]]; T :
skT
Output: C: [[µk+1]]
1: C: [[∇g(µk)]]← (−ACQ−1C AᵀC)⊗[[µk]]⊕(−ACQ−1C )⊗[[cA]]⊕
(−1)⊗ [[bA]]
. Compute the encrypted gradient as in (14)
2: C: [[µ¯k]]← [[µk]]⊕ η ⊗ [[∇g(µk)]] . Update the value in the
ascent direction
3: C, T truncate [[µ¯k]] to l bits
4: C execute Protocol 1: C gets [[ak]], [[bk]] . Randomly assign
[[ak]], [[bk]] with values of [[µ¯k]], [[0]]
5: C, T execute Protocol 2 element-wise on inputs [[ak]], [[bk]]: T
gets tk . Secure comparison protocol
6: C, T execute Protocol 3: C obtains [[µk+1]] . Secure update
protocol that ensures µk+1 = max{µ¯k, 0}
Line 3 ensures that the updated iterate has the required
number of bits for the comparison protocol. This step is
achieved by an exchange between the cloud and target node:
the cloud additively blinds the iterate by a random number,
sends it to the target node, which decrypts and truncates the
sum and sends it back, where the cloud then subtracts the
truncated random number.
The proof of security in the semi-honest model follows
similar steps as in the argmax protocol in [58] and we will
address it in Appendix C-A.
Proposition 2. Protocol 4 is secure in the semi-honest model,
according to Definition 4.
Using the building blocks described above, we can finally
assemble the protocol that privately solves the constrained
quadratic optimization problem (8) with private data and sends
the optimal solution to the target node. The public key pkT
and bit-length l are known by all the parties, hence we omit
them from the inputs.
PROTOCOL 5: Privacy preserving algorithm for solving
strictly-convex quadratic optimization problems
Input: Ai=1,...,p: bA = {bj}j=1,...,m, cA = {cj}j=1,...,n; C: AC ∈
Rm×n, QC ∈ Sn++,K; T : skT ,K
Output: T : x∗
1: for i=1,. . . ,p do
2: Ai : encrypt the private information msgi ← ([[bi]], [[ci]])
3: Ai : send the encrypted messages to C
4: end for
5: C: Construct the vectors [[bA]] and [[cA]] from the messages
6: C: η ← 1/λmax(ACQ−1C AᵀC)
7: C: Choose a random positive initial value µ0 for the dual variable
and encrypt it: [[µ0]]
8: for each k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 do
9: C, T execute Protocol 4: C gets [[µk+1]] . C, T securely
effectuate an iteration of the dual projected gradient ascent
10: end for
11: C: [[x∗]] ← (−Q−1C AᵀC)⊗ [[µK ]]⊕ (−Q−1C )⊗ [[cA]] and send
it to T . Compute the primal optimum from the optimal dual
solution as in (15)
12: T : Decrypt [[x∗]] and output x∗
E. Fixed-point arithmetic
The optimization problem (8) is defined on real variables,
whereas the Paillier encryption scheme is defined on integers.
To address this issue, we adopt a fixed-point arithmetic setting,
where we allow for a number to have a fixed number of
fractional bits. First, we consider numbers that have the
magnitude between −2li−1 < x < 2li−1. Second, we consider
a value having li bits for the integer part and lf bits for the
fractional part. Therefore, by multiplying the real values by
2lf and truncating the result, we obtain integers. We choose
l = li + lf large enough such that the loss in accuracy is
negligible and assume that there is no overflow. For ease of
exposition, we consider this data processing done implicitly
in the protocols described.
The random numbers used for blinding the sensitive values
(in Protocols 2 and 3) are sampled uniformly from the integers
in ZN of l + λ bits, where λ is the statistical security
parameter, as already explained in Section II, chosen such that
brute-forcing the solution is intractable. In order to guarantee
correctness of the comparison protocol, no overflow must take
place, so we must impose log2N > l + λ+ 1.
The errors in the solution caused by the fixed-point arith-
metic operations necessary for the encryption can be analyzed
with the same tools as in [24], [63], [64]. The round-off errors
can be regarded as states in a stable dynamical system with
bounded disturbances, and hence, have a bounded norm that
offers a guide on how to choose the number of fractional bits
lf for the fixed-point representation. On the other hand, the
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of the dual iterates. We considered feasible and bounded
problems – the dual problem (13) has a finite solution –
therefore, one can select the number of integer bits li in the
representation such that no overflow occurs.
VI. PRIVACY OF QUADRATIC OPTIMIZATION PROTOCOL
We will now introduce the main theoretical results of the
paper. In the interest of completeness of the paper, more
theoretical preliminaries needed for the privacy results, such
as semantic security, are given in Appendix A. We provide
the statements of the results and the main ideas of the proofs
here, and include the detailed arguments in Appendix C.
Theorem 1. Protocol 5 achieves privacy with respect to
Definition 4 for non-colluding parties.
The intuition for the proof is as follows. Consider an
iteration of the gradient ascent in Protocol 5. Firstly, in
the Paillier cryptosystem, two ciphertexts are computationally
indistinguishable to a party that does not have access to the
decryption key. Secondly, the exchanges between the cloud
and the target are additively blinded using a different random
number uniformly sampled from a large enough range (at least
λ bits more over the values that are desired to be blinded,
where the size of λ is chosen appropriately, as discussed in
Section IV-B. This means that the blinded message is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from a random number sampled from
the same distribution. Thirdly, the ciphertexts are refreshed (a
different encryption of the same value), after each exchange,
so a party that does not have access to the decryption key
cannot infer information about the encrypted values by simply
comparing the ciphertexts. Then, none of the parties can infer
the magnitude or the sign of the private variables. However,
we need to show that privacy is not broken by running an
iteration multiple times. We prove that storing the exchanged
messages does not give any new information on the private
data, using similar arguments. Formally, using Definition 4,
we construct a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator that
randomly generates messages from the inputs and outputs
such that its view and the view of the adversary, on the same
inputs, are computationally indistinguishable. The correctness
of Protocol 5 is immediate and follows from the correctness
of the dual gradient ascent algorithm and the correctness
of the comparison protocol. The detailed proof is given in
Appendix C-A.
Let us now consider collusions between the parties in the
setup and prove privacy of Protocol 5 under coalitions. The
definition of privacy is naturally extended in this case and
we can further establish the computational security in the
following result – see Appendix A for more details. Defini-
tion A.1 states that even under collusions, the protocol securely
computes a functionality, which in this case, is solving a
quadratic optimization problem. No further information is
revealed than what can inferred from the coalition’s inputs
and outputs. However, if all agents and the cloud collude then
they have access to all the information to solve the problem,
in which case the above result is rather vacuous. Similarly,
if the cloud colludes with the target node, then it can gain
access to all the private data of the agents. Hence, we consider
coalitions that involve either all the agents or the cloud and the
target node to be prohibited (and unrealistic) and only consider
coalitions between a strict subset of the agents and the cloud
or between a strict subset of the agents and the target node.
We give a complementary analysis on the information gained
from the inputs and outputs of coalitions in Section VIII.
Theorem 2. Protocol 5 achieves privacy with respect to
Definition A.1 against coalitions.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be derived from the proof of
Theorem 1 because the agents only contribute with their inputs
to the view of the coalition, and not with new messages than.
The proof is given in Appendix C-B.
VII. ALTERNATIVE QUADRATIC OPTIMIZATION PROTOCOL
WITHOUT SECURE COMPARISON
As explained in Section V-B, the major computation and
communication overhead of the above protocol is the secure
comparison protocol, required to project dual variables to non-
negative numbers. In this section, we describe a computation-
ally less involved alternative approach, which bypasses the
need for the secure comparison protocol, at the expense of
revealing more information. This approach is developed in
more detail in previous work [30].
Specifically, consider a step of the dual gradient algorithm
where the cloud maintains an unprojected gradient ascent step
µ¯k = µk − η[ACQ−1C (AᵀCµk + cA) + bA] encrypted using the
public key of the target node. Suppose the cloud multiplies the
elements in this vector with random scalar values rk uniformly
distributed over the positive integers and sends the products to
the target node. The latter can decrypt the message using its
private key and gain access not to the actual unprojected iterate
but to the randomly scaled version of it, which reveals the sign.
It can then project it to the non-negative orthant in an un-
encrypted fashion max{0, (rk)i(µ¯k)i} for i = 1, . . . ,m, and
finally encrypt the result using its own public key and return
it to the cloud. The cloud can divide the result with the previ-
ously selected values rk to compute in an encrypted fashion
the elements [[(µk+1)i]] = (1/(rk)i)⊗ [[max{0, (rk)i(µ¯k)i}]]
which is equivalent to the encrypted actual projected step
[[max{0, (µ¯k)i}]] for i = 1, . . . ,m, because division with a
positive number commutes with the max operator.
This protocol is presented next, and it can be employed
as an alternative for the more demanding Protocol 4, as it
bypasses the complexity of the secure comparison part. On the
other hand, as can be seen from the outputs of the protocol,
it reveals more information to the target node than the secure
comparison approach. In particular it reveals a scaled version
of the unprojected dual variable which in turn does not reveal
the magnitude of this value but reveals whether this is positive,
negative, or zero.
PROTOCOL 6: Alternative iteration of the dual projected
gradient ascent method
Input: C: AC ∈ Rm×n, QC ∈ Sn++, [[bA]], [[cA]], η > 0, [[µk]]; T :
skT
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Output: C: [[µk+1]]; T : (rk)i(µ¯k)i, i = 1, . . . ,m
1: C: [[∇g(µk)]]← (−ACQ−1C AᵀC)⊗[[µk]]⊕(−ACQ−1C )⊗[[cA]]⊕
(−1)⊗ [[bA]] . Compute the encrypted gradient as in (14)
2: C: [[µ¯k]]← [[µk]]⊕ η ⊗ [[∇g(µk)]] . Update the value in the
ascent direction
3: C: generate a random uniform positive scalar rk and send
(rk)i[[(µ¯k)i]] to T
4: T : decrypt and truncate (rk)i ⊗ [[(µ¯k)i]], i = 1, . . . ,m
5: T : compute max{(rk)i(µ¯k)i, 0}
6: T : encrypt [[max{(rk)i(µ¯k)i, 0}]] and send to T
7: C: compute [[µk+1]] = (1/(rk)i)⊗ [[max{(rk)i(µ¯k)i, 0}]], i =
1, . . . ,m
Recall that we can only perform operations on integers when
using the Paillier cryptosystem. To this end, we performed an
implicit multiplication by 2lf and truncation when encrypting
numbers and a division by the corresponding factor when
decrypting. For Algorithm 6 to work, we slightly modify this
technique. The reasoning is the following: we want the values
of rk to be large enough to blind the magnitude of the elements
of µ¯k, so we will randomly sample rk from the values of
γ + l bits, where γ is the security size for the multiplicative
blinding. Furthermore, we need to be able to represent 1/(rk)i
on the message space and to have enough precision as to
obtain the correct value of (µk+1)i in line 7. Hence, we
will perform implicit multiplications and divisions by 2l
′
f , for
l′f > l+γ. This change shows that, although significantly less
communication is required to perform the projection operation,
all the other operations are more expensive, because we work
with larger numbers.
Theorem 3. Protocol 5 with the iterations as in Protocol 6
achieves privacy according to Definitions 4 and A.1.
The proof follows similar steps as in the proof of the main
protocol in Section VI and is sketched in Appendix C-C.
VIII. PRIVACY DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss privacy aspects that differ from
the computational notions of Definitions 4 and A.1. Even if a
protocol does not leak any information, the known information
in a coalition (e.g., the output and some of the inputs) can
be used by the coalition to infer the rest of the private
inputs. More specifically, in our optimization problem, the
private variables and the optimal solution are coupled via the
optimality conditions (15)-(17), which are public knowledge,
irrespective of the protocol, and may be used for the purpose
described above.
Consider the following definition that concerns the retrieval
of private data from adversarial/known data.
Definition 5. (Non-unique retrieval) Let p be the private
inputs of a problem and let an algorithm A(p) solve that
problem. Let K be the adversarial knowledge of the problem,
which can contain public information, some private informa-
tion (including some parts of the input) and the output of
algorithm A for the adversary, denoted by AK(p). We say p
cannot be uniquely retrieved by the adversary if there exists a
set U , such that p ∈ U , |U| ≥ 2 and:
∀p′ ∈ U : AK(p) = AK(p′).
Definition 5 can be modified to be stronger by requiring the
set U to have an infinite number of elements.
In what follows, beyond the computational security analysis
of the previous sections, we carry out an algebraic analysis on
a black-box protocol that given the agent’s private data bA, cA
and the cloud’s matrices QC , AC , outputs the solution x∗ of
Problem (8) to the target node. We provide conditions such
that a coalition cannot uniquely determine unknown private
inputs from the output and a set of inputs, in the sense of
Definition 5. In particular, this analysis applies to Protocol 5
which, assuming it runs for sufficient iterations, outputs the
desired result x∗ to the target node. We perform this algebraic
analysis in the space of real numbers, which can be further
expanded to fixed-point arithmetics for large enough precision.
Suppose without loss of generality that a coalition between
p¯ agents (1 ≤ p¯ < p) has access to the elements b1, . . . , bm¯
with 0 ≤ m¯ ≤ m, and c1, . . . , cn¯ with 0 ≤ n¯ ≤ n. Then let
us define the decomposition of the matrix AC as:
AC =
[
A1
A21 A22
]
(19)
where the matrices A1 ∈ Rm¯×n, A21 ∈ R(m−m¯)×n¯,
A22 ∈ R(m−m¯)×(n−n¯).
Proposition 3. Consider a protocol solving Problem (8) and
a coalition between the target node and agents with access to
m¯ of the values of bA and n¯ of the values of cA. Suppose the
cost and constraint matrices AC , QC are public. Then:
(1) if m¯ < m and there exists a vector δ ∈ Rm−m¯ such that
δ 6= 0, δ  0 and Aᵀ21δ = 0, then the coalition cannot
uniquely retrieve the value of bA;
(2) if additionally n¯ < n and Aᵀ22δ 6= 0 then the coalition
cannot uniquely retrieve the value of cA.
The proof is based on the fact that the variables bA, cA,
x∗, µ∗ satisfy the optimality conditions (15)-(17). Specifically,
these are conditions that the unknown variables bm¯+1, . . . , bm
and cn¯+1, . . . , cn, as well as the optimal dual variables µ∗,
must satisfy given all the rest of the known variables. Hence,
if there are multiple such solutions to the KKT conditions the
coalition cannot uniquely determine the private variables. The
proof is given in Appendix C-D.
Proposition 4. Consider a protocol solving Problem (8) and
a coalition between the cloud and agents with access to m¯ of
the values of bA and n¯ of the values of cA. Then, a coalition
that satisfies m¯ < m and n¯ < n cannot uniquely retrieve the
values of bA, cA and x∗.
The proof easily follows from the fact that QC is a positive
definite matrix, hence, the solution x∗ is finite, and AC does
not have any columns or rows of zeros. A coalition between
the cloud and the p¯ < p agents cannot solve (8) since it lacks
all the data to define it (m¯ < m and n¯ < n), so it cannot
uniquely retrieve x∗ and the rest of the agents’ private data.
Propositions 3 and 4 give general sufficient conditions for
the desired non-unique retrieval property to hold and are
independent of the exact problem instance values. If the
conditions stated are not satisfied, then the previous result
in Theorem 2 still holds. However, the additional non-unique
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retrieval property may fail because the inputs and outputs of
the coalition are sufficient to leak information about the rest
of the private inputs. The above analysis can also be extended
to the case where some of the matrices QC , AC are private
information.
Let us now use Definition 5 to analyze Protocol 6 and the
effect the release of more information to the target node has on
the privacy of the inputs of the honest agents. We perform the
analysis at a setup where the protocol runs for a sufficient
number of iterations and hence the dual variable µk has
converged to the true optimal value µ∗ and the algorithm has
also converged to the true optimal primal value x∗. Suppose
the target node has access to the sign of the unprojected
optimal dual variable µ∗ + ∇g(µ∗) – note that this is the
case when we employ Protocol 6. In combination with the
solution x∗, this information can be further employed by the
target node to infer private information of the agents.
Proposition 5. Consider a protocol solving Problem (8) where
the target node has access to the solution x∗ and also the
sign of the unprojected optimal dual variables t := sign(µ∗+
∇g(µ∗)) ∈ {+1,−1, 0}m. Suppose further the matrix AC
is publicly available. Then the private values bA cannot be
uniquely retrieved by the target node if and only if ti < 0 for
some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Here ti < 0 implies that the corresponding optimal dual
value is zero, µ∗i = 0. This means that the corresponding
constraint in problem (8) is inactive at the optimal solution
x∗ [59, Ch. 5] and the target node cannot uniquely determine
the ith element of the corresponding bound bA. In the opposite
case, if all constraints (16) are either active or redundant at
the optimal solution (µ∗  0), this is revealed to the target
node because in that case ti ≥ 0, and the private value bA is
uniquely determined by bA = ACx∗.
Proposition 6. Consider the setup of Proposition 5 and the
matrix QC is publicly available. The private values cA cannot
be uniquely retrieved from the outputs x∗ and t of the target
node if and only if ti > 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The case ti > 0 corresponds now to the case where the
corresponding constraint is active at the optimal solution x∗.
When this fails, all constraints are inactive at x∗ and they do
not play a role. Hence, we have an unconstrained quadratic
problem in (8), i.e., the optimal solution satisfies the first order
condition QCx∗+cA = 0, which reveals the value of cA to the
target. To guarantee privacy with respect to both private values
bA, cA we need both an inactive constraint (ti < 0) as well
as an active constraint (tj > 0) for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
leaving some uncertainty in the estimations performed by the
target node. Similar analysis may be performed for collusions,
e.g., of the target node and some agents.
Finally, we note that here we analyzed the non-unique
retrieval properties of the problem considering black-box
protocols. It is of value to also consider additional steps
when designing a protocol that solves Problem (8) to prevent
information leakage if the conditions in the propositions are
not satisfied. It may be possible to use techniques such as
Differential Privacy to augment the cryptographic privacy of
the protocol with output privacy, by adding correlated data to
the inputs. This approach lies out of the scope of our paper,
but works such as [42]–[44] may be helpful to this end.
IX. IMPLEMENTATION
The efficiency of a secure multi-party protocol is measured
in the complexity of the computations performed by each
party, along with the rounds of communications between the
parties. While the former is relevant from the perspective of the
level of computational power required, the latter are relevant
when communication is slow.
In the setup we considered, the agents are practically low-
power platforms, hence, they are only required to effectuate
one encryption and one communication round, but the cloud
and the target node are platforms with high computational
capabilities, e.g., servers.
Let σ be the bit-length of the modulus N . Then, the size of a
Paillier ciphertext is 2σ, regardless of the size of the plaintext
in ZN . A Paillier encryption takes one online exponentiation
and one multiplication modulo N2, and a decryption takes one
exponentiation modulo N2 and one multiplication modulo N .
The addition of two ciphertexts takes one modular multipli-
cation modulo N2. A multiplication of a ciphertext with a
plaintext of l bits is achieved as a modular exponentiation
modulo N2. A multiplication of two elements in Z∗N2 can
be achieved in O((2σ)1.7). A modular exponentiation in N2
with an l-bit exponent can be computed in lO((2σ)2) and
can be sped up via the Chinese Remainder Theorem when
the factorization of N is known. A DGK encryption takes
one modular exponentiation and one modular multiplication
in Z∗NDGK , and a DGK decryption – checking if the encrypted
message is 0 or not – takes an exponentiation modulo pDGK .
We implemented the protocol proposed in Section V-D in
Python 3 and ran it on a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor.
For random instances of the data in Problem (8), with σ =
1024 and l = 32 bits, and 0 ms delay for communication,
we obtain the average running times depicted with the dashed
gray lines in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The simulations are run
for 30 iterations, for ease of comparison.
Figure 2 depicts the online execution time of Protocol 5
with the iterations as in Protocol 4. As expected, because
we work in the dual space, the time required for running
the iterations varies very little with the number of variables,
but increases with the number of constraints. However, in the
case of Figure 3, which depicts the online execution time
of Protocol 5 with the iterations as in Protocol 6, the time
varies more with the number of variables n and not as much
with m as Protocol 4 does. The reason is that we work with
substantially larger numbers than in the previous case, due to
the large factor with which we have to multiply in order to
be able to de-mask the dual iterate, which amplifies the time
difference between problems of different dimensions.
The trade-off between the privacy and communication can
be seen when we artificially add a communication delay of
2 ms between the cloud and the target node, to simulate the
delays that can occur on a communication network. It can be
observed in Figures 2 and 3 that the communication delay has
12
Fig. 2. Comparison between the average running time of Protocol 5 with the
iterations as in Protocol 4 for problem instances with the number of variables
on the abscissa and the number of constraints in the legend. The colored
lines indicate the running times when adding a 2 ms communication delay,
and the corresponding gray dashed lines indicate the running times for the
undelayed version. The simulation is run for 30 iterations, a 1024 bit key and
32 bit messages, with 16 bit precision. The statistical parameter for additive
blinding is 100 bits.
Fig. 3. Comparison between the average running time of Protocol 5 with the
iterations as in Protocol 6 for problem instances with the number of variables
on the abscissa and the number of constraints in the legend. The colored lines
indicates the running times when adding a 2 ms communication delay, and the
corresponding gray dashed lines indicate the running times for the undelayed
version. The simulation is run for 30 iterations, a 1024 bit key and 32 bit
messages, with 16 bit precision. The statistical parameter for multiplicative
blinding is 40 bits.
a smaller effect on the less private Protocol 6 than on the fully
private Protocol 4.
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APPENDIX A
CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
Proving a protocol is secure in the semi-honest model
involves a heavy use of tools from cryptography, which we
present here for the interested reader. In this Appendix, we aim
to give closure to the security notions introduced in Section III,
as well as provide the details of the Paillier encryptions
scheme, used throughout the paper and generically introduced
in Section IV. Furthermore, we detail the tools used in the
proof of Theorem 1, such as semantic security.
A. Security of multi-party protocols in the semi-honest model
The next definition concerns security in the multi-party
computation setup considering coalitions of a number of
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parties. Essentially, it extends Definition 4 and states that
a multi-party protocol privately computes the functionality
it runs if everything that a coalition of parties can obtain
from participating in the protocol and keeping records of
the intermediate computations can be obtained only from the
inputs and outputs of these parties.
Definition A.1. (Multi-party privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behav-
ior [51, Ch. 7]) Let f : ({0, 1}∗)n → ({0, 1}∗)n be a n-ary
functionality, where fi(x1, . . . , xn) denotes the i-th element
of f(x1, . . . , xn). Denote the inputs by x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn). For
I = {i1, . . . , it} ⊂ [n] = {1, . . . , n}, we let fI(x¯) denote
the subsequence fi1(x¯), . . . , fit(x¯), which models a coalition
of a number of parties. Let Π be a n-party protocol that
computes f . The view of the i-th party during an execution
of Π on the inputs x¯, denoted V Πi (x¯), is defined as in
Definition 4, and we let the view of a coalition be denoted
by V ΠI (x¯) = (I, V
Π
i1
(x¯), . . . , V Πit (x¯)). For a deterministic
functionality f , we say that Π privately computes f if there
exist simulators S, such that, for every I ⊂ [n], it holds that,
for x¯t = (xi1 , . . . , xit):
{S(I, (x¯t), fI(x¯t))}x¯∈({0,1}∗)n c≡ {V ΠI (x¯)}x¯∈({0,1}∗)n .
Remark A.1. ( [51, Ch. 7], [50, Ch. 4]) Auxiliary inputs,
which are inputs that capture additional information avail-
able to each of the parties (e.g. local configurations, side-
information), are implicit in Definition 4 and Definition A.1.
Definition 4 and Definition A.1 state that the view of any of
the parties participating in the protocol, on each possible set
of inputs, can be simulated based only on its own input and
output. The intuition behind the above definitions can also be
viewed as follows: consider a black-box protocol that receives
the inputs of Problem (8) and solves it, not exchanging any
messages in order to achieve the solution. Such a black-box
protocol satisfies Definitions 4 and A.1. In other words,
meeting the requirements of the above definitions is equivalent
to not revealing any other information than what is already
known to any of the parties, i.e. inputs, prescribed outputs, if
any, and previously known side information, meaning details
about the optimization algorithm.
Remark A.2. Satisfying Definitions 4 and A.1 is a stronger
requirement than guaranteeing that an adversary cannot
uniquely retrieve the data of the honest parties, i.e. Defini-
tion 5.
Revealing sensitive information does not always lead to a
unique retrieval of the private data. Nevertheless, any piece
of information revealed by the execution of the protocol, that
cannot be obtained only from its inputs and outputs, leads to
the violation of Definitions 4, A.1, even if the private data
cannot be singled out with this information.
B. Paillier cryptosystem
In this part, we will provide the rest of the details regarding
the implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem, introduced in
Section IV. The pair of keys corresponding to this cryptosys-
tem is (pk, sk), where the public key is pk = (N, g) and the
secret key is sk = (γ, δ). N called the modulus and is the
product of two large prime numbers p, q, and g is an element
of order N in the multiplicative group Z∗N2 . Furthermore,
γ = lcm(p−1, q−1), δ = ((gγ mod N2−1)/N)−1 mod N.
A simpler variant to generate the pair of keys when p and
q have the same number of bits is to choose g = N + 1,
γ = φ(N) = (p−1)(q−1), where φ is Euler’s totient function
and δ = φ(N)−1 mod N .
For a plaintext a ∈ ZN , the Paillier encryption is:
[[a]] = garN mod N2, (20)
where r is a random non-zero element in ZN , which makes
Paillier a probabilistic encryption scheme. Therefore, the
ciphertexts do not preserve the order relation between the
plaintexts. The decryption primitive is the following:
a = (([[a]]γ mod N2 − 1)/N)δ mod N, (21)
which uses the fact that (1 +N)a = 1 +Na mod N2.
In the Paillier scheme, in order to obtain addition between
plaintexts, the operation between ciphertexts is modular mul-
tiplication, which was denoted by ⊕ in the text:
[[a]] · [[b]] = garN mod N2 · gbr′N mod N2
= ga+b(rr′)N mod N2
= [[a+ b]] mod N2.
(22)
Negation is achieved by modular inverse:
[[a]]−1 = g−a(r−1)N mod N2
= [[−a]] mod N2. (23)
The multiplication between a plaintext value c and an
encrypted value [[a]], which was denoted by c ⊗ [[a]] in the
text, is obtained in the following way:
[[a]]c = gac(rc)N mod N2 = [[ca]]. (24)
Remark A.3. The Paillier cryptosystem is malleable, which
means that a party that does not have the private key can
alter a ciphertext such that another valid ciphertext is ob-
tained. Malleability is a desirable property in order to achieve
cloud-outsourced computation on encrypted data, but allows
ciphertext attacks. In this work, we assume that the parties
have access to authenticated channels, therefore an adversary
cannot alter the messages sent by the honest parties.
C. Semantic security of a cryptosystem
Proving security in the semi-honest model involves the
concepts of semantic security of an encryption scheme. Under
the assumptions of decisional composite residuosity [15] and
hardness of factoring, the partially homomorphic encryption
schemes Paillier and DGK are semantically secure and have
indistinguishable encryptions, which, in essence, means that
an adversary that has the plaintext messages a and b cannot
distinguish between the encryption [[a]] and encryption [[b]].
Definition A.2. (Semantic Security [51, Ch. 5]) An encryp-
tion scheme is semantically secure if for every probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm, A, there exists a probabilistic
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polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that for every two poly-
nomially bounded functions f, h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and for
any probability ensemble {Xn}n∈N, |Xn| ≤ poly(n), for any
positive polynomial p and sufficiently large n:
Pr [A(E(Xn), h(Xn), 1n) = f(Xn)] <
Pr [A′(h(Xn), 1n) = f(Xn)] + 1/p(n),
where E(·) is the encryption primitive.
The security parameter n is given as input in the form 1n
to A and A′ to ensure they can run in poly(n)-time.
APPENDIX B
COMPARISON PROTOCOL
Consider a two-party computation problem under an en-
cryption scheme that does not support comparison between
encrypted data. A number of secure comparison protocols on
private inputs owned by two parties have been proposed in
the literature [17], [65]–[67] etc., with a survey of the state
of the art given in [68]. Most of the comparison protocols
have linear complexity in the size of the inputs, since the
comparison is done bitwise. Out of these, the DGK protocol
proposed in [17] with the correction in [61] remains one
of the most computationally efficient protocols, and [66] is
the most efficient for large-scale protocols. [67] proposes a
comparison that is sublinear in the number of invocation of
the cryptographic primitive, but has greater communication
complexity and is only competitive for large inputs, due to the
constants involved. Depending on the specific problem, some
variants might be better than others. Since this comparison
protocol is used as a block, it can be easily replaced in
Protocol 2 once more efficient protocol are proposed.
In [17], [61], Damga˚rd, Geisler and Krøigaard describe
a protocol for secure comparison protocol and towards that
functionality, they propose the DGK additively homomorphic
encryption scheme with the property that it is efficient to
determine if the value zero is encrypted, which is useful for
comparisons and when working with bits. The authors also
prove the semantic security of the DGK cryptosystem under
the hardness of factoring assumption.
The plaintext space for DGK is Zu, where u is a small
prime divisor of p − 1 and q − 1, where p, q are large, same
size prime numbers, and N = pq. Parameters vp and vq are
t-bit prime divisors of p − 1 and q − 1. The numbers g and
h are elements of Z∗N of order uvpvq and vpvq . The DGK
encryption scheme has public key pkDGK = (N, g, h, u)DGK
and skDGK = (p, q, vp, vq)DGK . For a plaintext x ∈ Zu, a
DGK encryption is:
[a] = gahr mod N,
with r a random 2t-bits integer, which makes DGK a prob-
abilistic encryption scheme. We use this encryption scheme
with the purpose of encrypting and decrypting bits that rep-
resent comparison results, therefore, for decryption, we only
need to check if the encrypted value is 0. For this, it is enough
to verify:
[a]vpvq mod p = 1
to see if a = 0. Since DGK is an additively homomorphic
scheme, the following holds, where D(·) is the DGK decryp-
tion primitive:
a+ b = D([a] · [b] mod N), −a = D([a]−1 mod N). (25)
We will use again ⊕ and ⊗ to abstract the addition between
and encrypted values, respectively, the multiplication between
a plaintext and an encrypted values.
Protocol 2 calls the DGK protocol, presented in [62, Proto-
col 3]. The two parties have each their own private input α,
respectively β. Using the binary representations of α and β,
the two parties exchange l blinded values such that each of
the parties will obtain a bit δC ∈ {0, 1} and δT ∈ {0, 1}
that satisfy the following relation: δC Y δT = (α ≤ β)
after executing Protocol 7, where Y denotes the exclusive or
operation. Then, in Protocol 2 line 8, C obtains the encrypted
bit [[t′]] that satisfies (t′ = 1)⇔ (β < α).
To guarantee the security of the DGK scheme, we choose a
key-size that makes factoring hard and set the randomization
in the encryption primitive to be of length greater than 2t bits,
for t = 160. See more details in [17], [61].
PROTOCOL 7: Protocol for secure two-party comparison with
plaintext inputs using DGK [17], [62]
Input: C: α; T : β, skT , skDGK
Output: C: δC ; T : δT such that δC ⊕ δT = (α ≤ β)
1: T : send the encrypted bits [βi], 0 ≤ i < l to C
2: for each 0 ≤ i < l do
3: C: [αi Y βi]←
{
[βi] if αi = 0
[1]⊕ (−1)⊗ [βi] otherwise
4: end for
5: C: Choose uniformly random bit δC ∈ {0, 1}
6: C: Compute set L = {i|0 ≤ i < l and αi = δC}
7: for each i ∈ L do
8: C: compute [ci]←∑lj=i+1[αj Y βj ] . encrypted sum
9: C: [ci]←
{
[1]⊕ [ci]⊕ (−1)⊗ [βi] if δC = 0
[1]⊕ [ci] otherwise
10: end for
11: C: generate uniformly random non-zero values ri of 2t bits,
0 ≤ i < l
12: for each 0 ≤ i < l do
13: C: [ci]←
{
ri ⊗ [ci] if i ∈ L
[ri] otherwise
14: end for
15: C: send the values [ci] in random order to T
16: T : if at least one of the values ci is decrypted to zero, set δT ←
1, otherwise set δT ← 0
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF MAIN RESULTS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
For simplicity of the exposition, we avoid mentioning the
public data (public keys pkT , pkDGK , number of iterations
K and number of bits l) in the views, since all parties have
access to them. In what follows, we will successively discuss
the views of each type of party participating in the protocol:
agents, cloud and target node. As mentioned in Definitions 4
16
and A.1, the views of the parties during the execution of
Protocol 5 are constructed on all the inputs of the parties
involved and symbolize the real values the parties get in the
execution of the protocol. We will denote by I the inputs of
all the parties:
I = {bA, cA, AC , QC , skT , skDGK}.
Furthermore, in order to construct a simulator that simulates
the actions of a party, we need to feed into it the inputs and
outputs of that respective party.
1) Simulator for one agent Ai: Agent Ai, for every
i = 1, . . . , p, has the following inputs IAi = ({bj}j=1,...,mi ,
{cj}j=1,...,ni). To avoid cluttering, we will drop the subscripts
j = 1, . . . ,mi and j = 1, . . . , ni. Then agent Ai has the
following view:
VAi(I) := (bj , cj , [[bj ]], [[cj ]], coins),
where coins represent the random values used for encryption.
The agents are only online to send their encrypted data to the
cloud, and they do not have any role and output afterwards.
Hence, a simulator SAi would simply generate the random
values necessary to encrypt its inputs as specified by the
protocol and output the view obtained such:
SAi := (bj , cj , ˜[[bj ]], ˜[[cj ]], c˜oins),
where by (˜·) we denote the quantities obtained by the
simulator, which are different than the quantities of the agents,
but follow the same distribution. Hence, it is trivial to see that
the protocol is secure in the semi-honest model from the point
of view of the interaction with the agents.
Next, we want to prove the privacy of the protocol from the
point of view of the interactions with the cloud and the target
node. We will construct a sequence of algorithms such that we
obtain that the view of the real parties after the execution of
K iterations is the same as the view of simulators that simply
execute K iterations with random exchanged messages.
2) Simulator for the cloud C: For the simplicity of the
exposition, we will treat µ, bA and cA as scalars. The same
steps are repeated for every element in the vectors. For clarity,
we will form the view of the cloud in steps, using pointers
to the lines in Protocol 5. The view of the cloud during the
execution of lines 5-6 is:
V −1C (I) =
(
AC , QC , η, [[bA]], [[cA]], [[µ0]], coins
)
=: I−1C ,
(26)
where coins represent the random values generated for the
Paillier encryption. Furthermore, we construct the view of the
cloud at iteration k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 during the execution of
an instance of Protocol 4, which will be constructed on the
inputs of all parties: the inputs I and the data the parties had
at iteration k−1. We denote the view of the cloud at iteration
k− 1 by Ik−1C which, along with I and the view of the target
node at iteration k − 1, denoted by Ik−1T (30), will be what
the view is constructed on at iteration k.
I¯k−1 := I ∪ Ik−1C ∪ Ik−1T , (27)
IkC := V
k
C (I¯k−1) =
(
Ik−1C , [[µk]], [[µ¯k]], pik, coins1k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 1
, (28)
ρk, [[tk]],mcompk , coins2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 2
, rk, sk, [[vk]], [[µk+1]], coins3k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 3
)
,
where mcompk are messages exchanged in the comparison
protocol, and coinsjk, for j = 1, 2, 3 are the random numbers
generated in Protocol j. Finally, the view of the cloud after
the execution of line 11 in Protocol 5 is:
V KC (I¯K−1) =
(
IK−1C , [[x
∗]]). (29)
Therefore, the view of the cloud during the whole execution
of Protocol 5 is:
VC(I) := V KC (I¯K−1).
We first construct a simulator on the inputs IC = {AC , QC}
that mimics V −1C (I) in (26):
• Generate n+m random numbers of l bits b˜A, c˜A;
• Generate a random positive initial value µ˜0;
• Generate n + m + 1 uniformly random numbers for the
Paillier encryption and denote them c˜oins;
• Compute [[b˜A]], [[c˜A]], [[µ˜0]];
• Compute η following line 6;
• Output I˜−1C := S
−1
C (IC) =
(
AC , QC , [[b˜A]], [[c˜A]], η, [[µ˜0]],
c˜oins
)
.
Since Protocol 4 is secure in the semi-honest model (Propo-
sition 2), we know that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time (ppt) simulator for the functionality of Protocol 4 on
inputs (AC , QC , [[bA]], [[cA]], η, [[µk]]) and output [[µk+1]].
However, we need to show that we can simulate the func-
tionality of consecutive calls of Protocol 4, or, equivalently,
on one call of Protocol 4 but on the augmented input that
contains the data of the cloud in the previous iterations. Call
such a simulator SkC , that on the input I
k−1
C mimics V
k
C (I¯k−1)
in (28), for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1:
• Compute [[∇g(µk)]] and [[µ¯k]] as in lines 1-2 of Protocol 4
from [[µk]], [[bA]], [[cA]] which are included in Ik−1C ;
• Generate a random permutation pik and apply it on
([[0]], [[µ¯k]]) as in Protocol 1;
• Follow Protocol 2 and replace the incoming messages by
DGK encryptions of appropriately sized random values to
obtain ρ˜k, m˜compk ;
• Generate random bit t˜k and its encryption [[t˜k]];
• Generate random values r˜k and s˜k as in line 1 in Protocol 3
and their encryptions [[r˜k]], [[s˜k]];
• Obtain [[v˜k]] by choosing between the elements of
pik([[0]], [[µ¯k]]) + (r˜k, s˜k) according to the generated t˜k;
• Compute [[µ˜k+1]] as in line 8 of Protocol 3;
• Denote the rest of the random values used for encryption
and blinding by c˜oinsk;
• Output I˜kC := S
k
C(I
k−1
C ) = (I
k−1
C , [[µ¯k]], [[pik]], [[z˜k]],
m˜compk , [[t˜k]], [[r˜k]], [[s˜k]], [[v˜k]], [[µ˜k+1]], c˜oinsk).
Finally, a trivial simulator I˜KC := S
K
C (I
K−1
C ) for
V KC (I¯K−1) is obtained by simply performing line 11 on the
inputs.
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Proposition C.1. SkC(I
k−1
C )
c≡ V kC (I¯k−1), for
k = −1, . . . ,K, where Ik−2C := IC .
Proof. For k = −1, due to the fact that the coins and the initial
iterate are generated by the simulator via the same distributions
as specified in the protocol, and due to the semantic security of
the Paillier encryption, which guarantees indistinguishability
of encryptions, we obtain that V −1C (I)
c≡ S−1C (IC).
For 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, (coins1k, coins2k, coins3k) s≡
c˜oinsk because they are generated from the same distribu-
tions. Similarly, the distributions of (pik, pik([[0]], [[µ¯k]])) and
(pik, pik([[0]], [[µ¯k]])) are the same and pik, pik are independent
of the other parameters. The quantities from the DGK protocol
ρ˜k
s≡ ρk and m˜compk c≡ mcompk either due to the semantic
security of the DGK protocol, e.g. [t˜′], [δ˜T ] or due to having
the same distributions, e.g. ρ˜k, δ˜C , α˜. The values in the update
step r˜k, s˜k are sampled from the same distribution as rk, sk,
and, finally, [[t˜k]], [[v˜k]], [[µ˜k+1]]
c≡ [[tk]], [[vk]], [[µk+1]] due
to the semantic security of the Paillier encryption. Thus,
Sk(Ik−1C )
c≡ V kC (I¯k−1).
For k = K, SKC (I
K−1
C )
c≡ V KC (I¯K−1) follows from the fact
that the simulator simply executes the last part of the protocol
and from the Paillier scheme’s semantic security.
Hence, we obtained that IkC
c≡ I˜kC , for k = −1, . . . ,K.
The essence of the proof of Proposition C.1 is that all the
messages the cloud receives are encrypted. Then, thanks to the
semantic security of the Paillier and DGK schemes, the extra
information included in I¯k−1 from the previous iterations
cannot be used to extract other information about the values
at iteration k. From this, we also have the next corollary:
Corollary C.1. SkC(I˜
k−1
C )
c≡ SkC(Ik−1C ), equivalent to
Sk+1C (S
k
C(I
k−1
C ))
c≡ Sk+1C (V kC (I¯k−1)), for any k =
0, . . . ,K − 1.
Finally, we construct a simulator SC(IC) for the execution
of Protocol 5 and we will show that its view will be computa-
tionally indistinguishable from VC(I). To this end, we define
the following sequence of views – obtained as hybrids between
the real views and the views of the simulators:
VC(I) = H−1(I) = V KC (I¯K−1)
H0(I) = SKC ◦ V K−1C (I¯K−2)
H1(I) = SKC ◦ SK−1C ◦ V K−2C (I¯K−3)
...
HK(I) = SKC ◦ SK−1C ◦ . . . ◦ S0C ◦ V −1C (I)
SC(IC) = HK+1(IC) = SKC ◦ SK−1C ◦ . . . ◦ S0C ◦ S−1C (IC).
By transitivity, H−1 and HK+1 are computationally indis-
tinguishable if:
H−1
c≡ H0 c≡ . . . c≡ Hk c≡ Hk+1 c≡ Hk+2 c≡ . . . c≡ HK+1.
This result follows from induction on Corollary C.1. In con-
clusion, we obtain that SC(IC)
c≡ VC(I), which verifies that
Protocol 5 achieves privacy with respect to the cloud.
3) Simulator for the target node T : We proceed with the
same steps in order to show that the consecutive K iterations
form a protocol that is secure in the semi-honest model from
the point of view of the target node. The main difference
is that for the cloud we used the semantic security of the
Paillier and DGK cryptosystems, while for the target we will
use the secrecy of the one-time pad variant used for blinding.
The symmetric encryption used in this paper, as discussed in
Section IV-B, to which we refer as blinding, guarantees that a
value of l bits additively blinded by a random value of l + λ
bits is statistically indistinguishable from a random value of
l + λ+ 1 bits.
The inputs and output of the target node in Protocol 5 are
IT = (skT , skDGK , x∗). As in (27), I¯k−1 represents the in-
puts of all the parties at iteration k, with I¯−1 = I. Then, the
view of the target node during iteration k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 is:
IkT :=V
k
T (I¯k−1) = (skT , skDGK , zk, tk,mcompk , coins2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 2
,
a¯k, b¯k, vk, coins3k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 3
). (30)
The view of the target node during the last step of the
protocol is:
V KT (I¯K−1) := (IK−1T , [[x∗]]). (31)
As before, the view of the target during the execution of
Protocol 5 is:
VT (I) := V KT (I¯K−1).
In order to be able to construct a simulator with indistin-
guishable view from the view of the target node, we need
to show that the target node is not capable of inferring new
relevant information about the private data (other than what
can be inferred solely from its inputs and outputs) although it
knows the optimal solution x∗ and has access to the messages
from multiple iterations.
Apart from the last message, which is the encryption of
the optimization solution [[x∗]], and the comparison results
tk, all the values the target node receives are blinded, with
different sufficiently large values at each iteration. The target
node knows that QCx∗ = A
ᵀ
CµK − cA and that µK = vK −
r¯K , for some random value r¯K . However, from these two
equations, although it has access to x∗ and vK , the target node
cannot infer any new information about the private data of the
agents or about µK , even when QC , AC are public, thanks to
the large enough randomization.
Let ak, bk = pik(0, µ¯k), where pik is a random permutation.
From Protocol 2, the target receives zk which is the additively
blinded value of bk−ak+2l, and other blinded values, denoted
in (30) as mcompk . Hence, provided the blinding noises are
refreshed at every iteration, the target node cannot infer any
information, as follows from Section IV-B. At the end of
the protocol, it receives the bit tk which is 1 if ak ≤ bk
and 0 otherwise. However, due to the uniform randomization
between the order of µ¯k and 0 at every iteration for assigning
the values of ak and bk, described in Protocol 1, the target
node cannot identify the sign of µ¯k, and by induction, the
sign of µ¯K−1 and magnitude of µK . This means that having
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access to x∗ = xK does not bring more information about the
blinded values from the intermediary steps.
We now investigate the relation between the messages from
consecutive iterations. From the update protocol 3, we know:
vk = (ak + rk)(1− tk) + (bk + sk)tk
µk+1 = vk − rk(1− tk)− sktk = ak(1− tk) + bktk,
where the variables are vectors. The target node knows the
values of vk and tk, but pik, µ¯k, rk, sk are unknown to it.
Furthermore, let pik+1 be the permutation applied by the cloud
at step k + 1 in Protocol 1, unknown to the target node.
Take for example the case when tk = 0 and tk+1 = 0. Let
Q˜ = I− ηACQ−1C AᵀC and E = [I 0]. Then:
vk+1 = ak+1 + rk+1 = Epik+1(0, Q˜(vk − rk)− ηACQ−1C cA−
− ηbA) + rk+1.
The above equation shows the target node cannot construct
vk+1 from vk. Similar equations arise when considering
the other values for tk and tk+1. This guarantees that an
integer v˜ik obtained by selecting uniformly at random from
(2l+λ, 2l+λ+1) ∩ ZN will have the distribution statistically
indistinguishable from vik. Moreover:
µk+2 = max{0, Q˜µk+1 − ηACQ−1C cA − ηbA}
= max{0, Q˜(vk − rk(1− tk)− sktk)− ηACQ−1C cA − ηbA}
= vk+1 − rk+1(1− tk+1)− sk+1tk+1.
Since the blinding noise is different at each iteration and
uniformly sampled, the target node cannot retrieve µk+2 from
vk and vk+1. In short, if the target node receives some random
values ˜¯ak, ˜¯bk ∈ (2l+λ, 2l+λ+1) ∩ ZN instead of ak + rk and
bk + sk respectively, it would not be able to distinguish the
difference. Similar arguments hold for the blinded messages
ci from the comparison protocol 7.
Hence, by processing multiple iterations, the target node can
only obtain functions of the private data that involve at least
one large enough random value, which does not break privacy.
We now build a simulator ST that applies the steps of
the protocol on randomly generated values. As before, since
Protocol 4 is secure in the semi-honest model (Proposition 2),
we know that there exists a ppt simulator for the functionality
of Protocol 4 on inputs I−1T = {skT , skDGK}. However,
we need to show that we can simulate the functionality of
consecutive calls of Protocol 4, or, equivalently, on one call
of Protocol 4 but on inputs (IkT , x
∗). Call such a simulator
SkT , that on the inputs (I
k
T , x
∗) should output a view that
is statistically indistinguishable from V kT (I¯k−1) in (30), for
k = 0, . . . ,K−1. We already showed that although the target
node has access to the output x∗ and to blinded messages from
all the iterations of Protocol 5, it cannot extract information
from them or correlate the messages to the iteration they arise
from, so x∗ will only be relevant in the last simulator.
• Generate a λ + l-length random integer ρ˜k and add 2l and
obtain z˜k;
• Generate a random bit t˜k;
• Choose a random bit δ˜T . If it is 0, then generate l non-
zero values of 2t bits, otherwise generate l − 1 non-zero
random values and one 0 value. Those will be the m˜compk
(see Protocol 7);
• Generate random integers of length l + λ+ 1 ˜¯ak and ˜¯bk;
• Compute v˜k according to t˜k;
• Denote all Paillier and DGK generated coins by c˜oins;
• Output I˜kT := S
k
T (I
k−1
T , x
∗) = (Ik−1T , z˜k, t˜k, m˜compk , ˜¯ak,˜¯bk, v˜k, c˜oins).
Finally, a trivial simulator I˜KT := S
K
T (I
K−1
T , x
∗) for
V KT (I¯K−1) is obtained by simply generating an encryption
of x∗ and outputting: (IK−1T , [˜[x∗]]).
Proposition C.2. SkT (I
k−1
T , x
∗)
c≡ V k(I¯k−1), for
k = 0, . . . ,K.
Proof. For 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, (coins2k, coins3k) s≡ c˜oinsk
because they are generated from the same distributions.
Similarly, z˜k
s≡ zk because ρ˜k s≡ bk − ak + ρk. From
the discussion above, the same holds for m˜compk and their
counterparts mcompk . Furthermore, (t˜k, ˜¯ak, ˜¯bk, v˜k) are statis-
tically indistinguishable from (tk, a¯k, b¯k, vk) due to the way
they are generated, and v˜k being consistent with t˜k. Thus,
Sk(Ik−1T , x
∗)
c≡ V k(Ik−1T ∪ I).
For k = K, SK(IK−1T , x
∗)
c≡ V K(I¯K−1) trivially follows
from the fact that both [[x∗]] and [˜[x∗]] are decrypted in x∗.
Hence, we obtained that I˜kT
c≡ IkT , for k = 0, . . . ,K.
The essence of the proof of Proposition C.2 is that all the
messages the target receives are blinded with large enough
random noise and the comparison bits are randomized. This
results in the messages being statistically indistinguishable
from random values of the same length, which means that
the extra information included in (Ik−1T , x
∗) from the previous
iterations cannot be used to extract other information about the
current values at iteration k. The next corollary then follows
from Proposition C.2:
Corollary C.2. SkT (I˜
k−1
T , x
∗)
c≡ SkT (Ik−1T , x∗), equivalent to
Sk+1T (S
k
T (I
k−1
T , x
∗), x∗)
c≡ Sk+1T (V k(I¯k−1), x∗), for any k =
1, . . . ,K − 1.
Finally, we construct a simulator ST (IT ) for the execution
of Protocol 5 and we show that its view will be statistically
indistinguishable from VT (I). To this end, we define the
following sequence, from which we drop the input x∗ to the
simulators to not burden the notation:
VT (I) = H0(I) = V KT (I¯K−1)
H1(I, x∗) = SKT ◦ V K−1T (I¯K−2)
H2(I, x∗) = SKT ◦ SK−1T ◦ V K−2T (I¯K−3)
...
HK(I, x∗) = SKT ◦ SK−1T ◦ . . . ◦ S1T ◦ V 0T (I)
ST (IT ) = HK+1(IT ) = SKT ◦ SK−1T ◦ . . . ◦ S1T ◦ S0T (IT )
By transitivity, H0 and HK+1 are statistically indistinguish-
able if:
H0
c≡ H1 c≡ . . . c≡ Hk c≡ Hk+1 c≡ Hk+2 c≡ . . . c≡ HK+1.
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The result follows from induction on Corollary C.2. In con-
clusion, we obtain that ST (IT )
c≡ VT (I) which verifies that
Protocol 5 achieves privacy with respect to the target node.
The proof of Theorem 1 is now complete.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We will now show that any coalition consistent with the
setup of Propositions 3, 4 and with the assumption that the
cloud and target node do not collude does not gain any new
information about the private data of the honest agents, other
than what can be inferred solely from the inputs and outputs
of the coalition. As mentioned in Section VI, the agents in a
coalition only add their inputs to the view of the coalition, but
do not have any messages in the protocol.
1) Simulator for the cloud C and p¯ agents Ai: Consider the
coalition between a set of agents Ai=1,...,p¯ and the cloud C,
which has the inputs ({bi}i=1,...,m¯, {ci}i=1,...,n¯, AC , QC) and
no output from the execution of Protocol 5. Since p¯ < p, the
coalition is not able to compute µ1 by itself, and the semantic
security of the Paillier cryptosystem is again enough to ensure
the privacy of the rest of the sensitive data. A simulator for
this coalition can be constructed following the same steps in
Section C-A2 on the augmented inputs defined above, from
the fact that every value the cloud receives is encrypted by a
semantically secure cryptosystem.
2) Simulator for the target node T and p¯ agents
Ai: Consider the coalition between a set of agents
Ai=1,...,p¯ and the target node T , which has the in-
puts ({bi}i=1,...,m¯, {ci}i=1,...,n¯, skT , skDGK) and output (x∗)
from the execution of Protocol 5. If both matrices QC , AC are
public, if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , p¯} such that aᵀi x∗ < bi,
the coalitions finds out µ∗i = 0, which comes from public
knowledge in the KKT conditions (17). From this, the coalition
is able to find some coins of the cloud: rK and sK associated
to element i. However, these values are independent from the
rest of the parameters and do not reveal any information about
the private inputs of the parties. Apart from this, the coalition
is not able to compute any private data of the honest parties
from the execution of the protocol, due to the secure blinding.
A simulator for this coalition can be build by following the
same steps as described in Section C-A3 on the augmented
inputs defined above.
The proof is now complete.
C. Sketch proof of Theorem 3
Following similar steps as in the proof of the main protocol
in Appendix C-A, simulators for the involved parties can
be constructed from their inputs and outputs. A simulator
for the cloud randomly generates the messages and the in-
distinguishability between the views is guaranteed by the
indistinguishability of the Pailler encryptions. The outputs of
Protocol 6 to the target node are different than the origi-
nal Protocol 4. This means that the outputs for the target
node in Protocol 5 with the iterations as in Protocol 6 are
(x∗, {(rk)i(µ¯k)i}i=1,...,m, k=0,...,K−1). In this case, a simula-
tor for the target node simply outputs its inputs as messages
in the view, and indistinguishability follows trivially. For the
multi-party privacy, simulators for the allowed coalitions can
be easily constructed by expanding the simulators for the cloud
and the target node with the auxiliary inputs from the agents
in the coalition.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
The coalition has access to the following data, which is
fixed: AC , QC , x∗, {bi}1,...,m¯, {ci}i,...,n¯.
Proof of (1). We need to address two cases: the non-strict
satisfaction of the constraints and the equality satisfaction of
the constraints.
(I) Suppose there exists a solution {bi}m¯+1,...,m and
{ci}n¯+1,...,n and µ to the KKT conditions such that aᵀi x∗ < bi
for some m¯+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In particular this implies that
µi = 0. Then define c′ := cA, µ′ := µ and b′ such that
b′j := bj for all j 6= i and b′i to take any value b′i ≥ aᵀi x∗.
The new set of points (b′, c′, µ′) is also a solution to the KKT
conditions, by construction.
(II) Alternatively, suppose there exists a solution {bi}m¯+1,...,m
and {ci}n¯+1,...,n and µ to the KKT conditions such that
aᵀj x
∗ = bj for all j = m¯+ 1, . . . ,m. Consider there exists
a vector δ that satisfies δ  0 and Aᵀ21δ = 0. Compute
 ≥ 0 as:  = min
(
µk
δk
)
δk>0,k=m¯+1,...,m
. Then, we construct
µ′ := µ − 
[
0
δ
]
that satisfies µ′  0 and µ′i = 0 for some
m¯+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m that is the argument of the above minimum.
Furthermore, define c′ := cA + 
[
0
Aᵀ22δ
]
and b′ such
that b′j := bj for all j 6= i and b′i to be any value b′i > bi.
Then (b′, c′, µ′) is also a solution to the KKT conditions. More
specifically, the complementarity slackness condition holds for
all j = m¯+ 1, . . . ,m:
µ′j (a
ᵀ
j x
∗ − b′j) = µ′j(aᵀj x∗ − bj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
) = 0, j 6= i
µ′i︸︷︷︸
=0
(aᵀi x
∗ − b′i) = 0, j = i.
(32)
Then we can check the gradient condition:
QCx∗ +A
ᵀ
Cµ
′ + c′ =
QCx∗ +A
ᵀ
C
(
µ− 
[
0
δ
])
+
(
c+ 
[
0
Aᵀ22δ
])
= QCx∗ +A
ᵀ
Cµ+ cA = 0.
(33)
Hence, b′ 6= bA satisfies the KKT conditions and the coalition
cannot uniquely determine bA.
Proof of (2). Consider a solution {bi}m¯+1,...,m and
{ci}n¯+1,...,n and µ to the KKT conditions. For some  > 0
define µ′ := µ+ 
[
0
δ
]
and c′ := cA − 
[
0
Aᵀ22δ
]
. Define
b′ such that for all j, it holds that b′j = a
ᵀ
j x
∗. Then (b′, c′, µ′)
is also a solution to the KKT conditions. Specifically, it
follows that µ′ ≥ 0. Moreover the complementarity slackness
condition holds by construction of b′, and as before the
gradient condition holds. Hence, c′ 6= cA satisfies the KKT
solution, and the coalition cannot uniquely determine cA.
